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western rebellion was worthy of more attention than it has as yet received from any of the English historians; that it was primarily religious rather than agrarian, and that it represented a large number of people militantly opposed to the policy of Edward VI and actively loyal to the old Roman forms. The study will be of value not only to students of English political history, but to those looking for further information in regard to the attitude of the English towards the Prayer Book.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

IN THE SERVICE OF THE KING. A PARSON'S STORY. JOSEPH B. DUNN.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1915. Pp. x, 158. \$1.25.

Autobiography is always interesting. This book is pre-eminently so, because the emphasis is laid not upon the events of the author's life but upon their bearing on the experience of ministers. It is full of cheerfulness, courage, humor, and deep piety; full of stimulus for those who fish for men.

THE PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY, Second Series, Volume IV, edited by Professor William W. Rockwell, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914 (pp. xxii, 215; \$3.00), contains, in addition to Reports of three Meetings, Addresses and Papers of permanent value. Among these are "Servatus Lupus, a Humanist of the Ninth Century," by the late president, Dr. Samuel M. Jackson; "The Mediæval National Church," by the president, Professor J. C. Ayer, Jr.; "The Stigmata of St. Francis," by C. H. Lyttle; "John Huss," by D. S. Schaff; "The Relation of Wessel Gansvoort to the Reformation," by E. W. Miller; "Luther and Toleration," by J. A. Faulkner; "The College of Cardinals and the Veto," by H. B. Washburn; "Religious History of the Negroes in the South," by R. C. Reed.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE DREAD OF RESPONSIBILITY. ÉMILE FAGUET, Member of the French Academy. Translated, with introduction, by EMILY JAMES PUTNAM.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. 221.

This brilliant monograph may properly claim the attention both of the psychologist and of the student of society. Its thesis is that the French people, mentally keen and able as they are, are unwilling

to accept, or temperamentally inhibited from accepting, the responsibilities which their various professions and occupations would naturally impose on them, and that the results of this tendency make themselves felt in the administration of justice, in the life of the family, in the history of the professions, and in the political life of the nation as a whole. "The French character," M. Faguet says, "is not on as high a level as the French mind, and that is the cause of all the trouble." The French mind is of the very first order. But the benefits which this intellectual power should render do not come to the fore, because as a people the French are, the writer thinks, light, wanting in character and will.

"We are prompt to give in. We are children, we are greybeards, we are never—I speak of the majority—in the prime of life. Without being lazy—far from it—we like to lie back on those who make us work. It is the paradox of our nature. We like to surrender ourselves to the State while allowing it to impose even heavy tasks upon us. The basis of this paradoxical inclination is the lack of personal will, and this lack of personal will itself comes from the horror of responsibility."

This thesis is supported by arguments based on a large array of facts. The first group of these is drawn from the state of legal procedure in France. The author says that the whole system of law (in France) and the whole legal usage of the régime which followed 1789 are dominated by the idea that he who judges is irresponsible, and that no blame is to be cast upon him. "In fact, the judge does not judge in equity, but in accordance with the law. In other words, he is not a judge, he is a clerk."

In this respect the French judges are compared unfavorably with English judges, and one is reminded here of the comparison which Francis Parkman drew between the French and English régimes in their American colonies during the long period which ended with the English occupation of Canada and the West. The French leaders were expected, Parkman says, to refer back continually to headquarters in Paris for instructions as to the conduct of their affairs. The Englishmen stood and marched forward, each man for himself, but with the sense that they were all working for the whole.

"The great vice of the bench in France," M. Faguet writes, "is that it is a career, like the department of registration, which one enters very young, at a very small salary, and in which, as everywhere, one advances very slowly if he confines himself to the correct performance of his duties; and where, as everywhere, one advances rapidly if he renders services to the government. Well, a man seeks advancement, he is dominated by the care for advancement, and he often does what is necessary to obtain it.

In England the bench is not a career; it is the crown of a career. There they make judges of old barristers, men who have achieved their career, and a brilliant one, at

the bar, and who have there formed habits of independence which they do not lose; moreover they have no reason to desire advancement because there is hardly anything left to advance to."

Among other examples illustrating the unfortunate side of this situation M. Faguet examines at some length the legal management of the questions involved in the decision of the Court of Cassation with regard to the final disposition of the case of Captain Dreyfus. This decision was evidently inspired, he says, not by a desire to do legal justice to the situation but to satisfy the government. The civil court felt itself irresponsible and wanted to be so. It said virtually, "Every one will understand that in bending the law to put an end to the Dreyfus case I obey the desire of the government. Carry your grievance to the government." Then the writer goes on to say:

"But what sort of a bench is that? It is a very wise bench, very prudent, very learned, even very honest, from which every thought of responsibility has vanished; that is the whole trouble. One of its ancestors, under the Restoration, said to the government of the time, 'The court gives decisions, not services.'"

Passing next to the professions, the author says the Frenchman's

"passionate desire, whether for himself or for his sons or for his daughters, is a profession of complete repose. . . . The fear of risk among us is appalling. The greatest insult you can offer the French bourgeois is to say to him, 'You ought to have your daughter learn a trade.' 'A trade? dressmaking? for what do you take me?' 'A less lucrative trade, school-teacher, professor.' 'A student? for what do you take me?'"

This same habit of mind, he believes, regulates the family life, and—to speak of only one point—determines the low birth-rate so characteristic of French society.

The most important portion, perhaps, of the whole argument relates to the political constitution and the political customs of the French people. The writer contrasts here the "real (though often slighted) responsibility" of the king with the relative irresponsibility of each of the constituent parts of the present government. "In our day," he says, "we have so constitutionally limited the responsibility of power as to make it practically nil." Really the president of the French Republic is a cipher, and yet is the nominal head. The author considers that France is the best example of a "pure democracy," the only other equally good example being the Athenian Republic during a short period. The Spartan, the Roman, and the Venetian Republics were, he thinks, not democ-

racies, but aristocracies; and "as for the American Republic, it is a constitutional monarchy, and nothing else."

This would not be the place to go far in the study of these conclusions and the consideration in detail of the arguments that are declared to lead to them. It will be enough to say that M. Faguet believes the best government to be an aristocracy, but an aristocracy not social but real—that is, based on merit and the power of co-operation.

"The aristocratic element in a nation is all that part which has enough of vitality and of cohesive force and of sense of responsibility to form a group, an association, an assemblage of parts, an organism, to become a living thing, that is to say, a collective person."

The writer admits, however, that the present system might be made to work fairly well if all persons concerned would consent to recognize the responsibility that rests on them to assume to their full extent the powers and obligations which are theirs by law. This brings us back to the main thesis of the book—namely, that while the French mind is of the very best sort, the French character and will do not match up to it.

Referring, in the last paragraph, to Nietzsche's much-talked-about "will to power," M. Faguet says,

"There is a great deal to be said about that; but there is a will of power that cannot be too highly recommended to and wished for those one loves, beginning with oneself; it is the will of power over oneself."

The reviewer does not feel competent to say whether the author of this book has marshalled his facts justly; and indeed, one criticism is made by the translator, Miss Emily James Putnam, in her interesting introduction. However this may be, it is an eminently useful task to call attention to the significance of a great psychological tendency such as that which the author defines under the name of the dread of responsibility. To discuss the thesis here involved from the psychological standpoint would again carry us too far. The reviewer would only say that in his opinion it is eminently desirable to get away from psychological characterizations which imply a lack and failure, and to substitute for them characterizations that call attention to active forces which are at work. Everything in the world is active. Failure is the result of a conflict in which tendencies of an inferior sort but still active gain the ascendancy. Looked at in this way, it would certainly be found that behind the dread of responsibility there lay a craving which

could be referred to a tendency having its main root in childhood which had outlived its usefulness and had become harmful. That such results can happen is due to men's ability to repress their childhood longings and yet to keep them virtually alive.

The translation is excellent to a rare degree, done in first-rate English yet without sacrifice of the flavor of the original.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.